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1  Introduction
In Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality1 (“Harvey”) the High Court had 
to decide whether it was competent to order the re-transfer of expropriated 
property to the previous owner when the purpose for which the property was 
expropriated could not be realised. In this decision the applicant’s property 
was expropriated for purposes of creating a recreational open space and 
conservation area for general use by the public, but when that purpose could 
not be realised the municipality decided to change the use of the property. 
The new purpose involved the sale of the land on tender to a private developer 
for the erection of residential houses. The applicant argued that the first 
respondent had an obligation to award him restitution of his former property 
– against payment of the market value – since the first respondent abandoned 
its plan to use the property for the original purpose.2
Since there is no legislative authority for this proposition in South African 
law the applicant relied on a particular interpretation of the public purpose 
requirement in section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”), based on authority in German law. The 
applicant argued that when the public purpose falls away, becomes impossible, 
or is changed, the expropriation is no longer “legally and constitutionally 
sustainable in the face of a claim to the property by the original owner”.3 
To substantiate this claim, the applicant relied on an argument made by Van 
der Walt.4 Relying on German law,5 Van der Walt states that if property was 
“expropriated for a public purpose that was never realised (or for a purpose 
that ceased to exist)”,6 the property should be returned to the previous owner, 
*  This note is based in part on BV Slade The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2012) ch 6. Thank you to Prof AJ van der Walt, as well as Dr Emma 
Waring and Ms Karen Bezuidenhout, for their helpful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are 
my own.
1 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP).
2 Para 80.
3 Para 80.
4 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2005) 256. In AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 3 ed (2011) 493-499, this argument was retained and expanded with reference to Harvey v Umhlatuze 
Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) and the Malaysian decision of United Development Company Sdn Bhd 
v The State Government of Sabah [2011] MLJ 209.
5 BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974], BVerfGE 56, 249 [1981] (Dürkheimer Gondelbahn); BVerfGE 97, 89 [1997].
6 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2005) 256; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 
494.
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even if compensation was paid.7 Therefore, if the public purpose falls away, 
the state is no longer justified in retaining the property. However, a notable 
difference in German law is the fact that German legislation specifically 
provides for the re-transfer of previously expropriated property upon non-
realisation of the public purpose and often provides for the amount that the 
previous owner has to repay in such an event.8 In the absence of legislation 
German courts have held that this principle of re-transfer is implied in the 
property guarantee in article 14 of the Basic Law of 1949.9 Since there is 
no equivalent doctrine or comparable legislation in South African law, the 
court in Harvey was not willing to order the re-transfer.10 Therefore, due to 
the absence of a legislative basis on which the court could grant the order of 
re-transfer the court rejected the applicant’s argument.
The Harvey decision received some attention in academic literature. Du 
Plessis, in pointing out flaws in the court’s logic, argues that the state only 
acquires conditional ownership when it expropriates property and that “the 
ownership remains conditional on the public purpose being fulfilled”.11 In 
this regard, and based on German law, Du Plessis argues that it should be 
possible – in the absence of specific legislation – to succeed with a claim for 
re-transfer based directly on the protective function of section 25.12 Sonnekus 
and Pleysier argue that the classification of the expropriated property to res 
publicae should be subject to a suspensive condition meaning that the property 
is capable of being reclaimed through the rei vindicatio by the previous 
owner until such time that the public purpose for which the property was 
expropriated is realised.13 Van der Walt and Slade argue that even though one 
can have sympathy with the High Court for refusing to order the re-transfer 
of expropriated property upon non-realisation of the public purpose, the court 
7 See further R Wendt “Eigentum, Erbrecht und Enteigung” in M Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar 4 ed 
(2007) 582 629 para 165.
8 For instance, legislation such as the German Federal Building Code (Bundesbaugesetz 1960), amongst 
others, specifically provides for “re-expropriation”. See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 
601 (KZP) paras 129-131; E du Plessis “Restitution of Expropriated Property upon Non-realisation of the 
Public Purpose” (2011) TSAR 579 588-589. See also JC Sonnekus & AJH Pleysier “Eiendomsverwerwing 
of –verlies onder `n Tydsbepaling of `n Voorwaarde en die Privaatregtelike Implikasies vir Onteiening 
(Deel 2)” (2011) TSAR 601 613-619.
9 BVerfGE 38, 175 [1974]; Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 97. See also DP 
Currie The Constitution of the Republic of Germany (1994) 293-294; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 149; Du Plessis (2011) TSAR 589; AJ van der Walt & 
BV Slade “Public Purpose and Changing Circumstances: Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 
2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP)” (2012) 129 SALJ 219 220.
10 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 134. The High Court relied on the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 
768 (CC) para 97, where the Court held that foreign law cannot by “simplistic transference” determine the 
proper interpretation of the South African Bill of Rights. See also Du Plessis (2011) TSAR 582.
11 Du Plessis (2011) TSAR 592.
12 592.
13 Sonnekus & Pleysier (2011) TSAR 610-613. The authors argue that the expropriation is not yet completed, 
in other words the state has not yet obtained “ownership” of the property, until the purpose for which the 
property is expropriated has been realised.
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should have considered whether the new changed purpose is also a valid 
public purpose or in the public interest.14
It has already been stated that there is no legislative basis on which a claim 
for re-transfer of expropriated property upon non-realisation of the public 
purpose could be founded on. Van der Walt and Slade submit that either the 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 should be amended or legislation similar to that 
which exists in German law should be promulgated in order to regulate this 
matter.15
In March 2013 a Draft Expropriation Bill was released for public 
comment.16 The purpose of the Bill is to “align the Expropriation Act with 
the Constitution and to provide a common framework to guide the processes 
and procedures for the expropriation of property by organs of state”.17 The 
aim of this note is to point out that the Expropriation Bill, if passed into law, 
fails to address the Harvey scenario adequately although it allows for previous 
owners to repurchase previously expropriated property upon non-realisation 
of the public purpose in very limited circumstances.
2  Section 4 of the 2013 Draft Expropriation Bill
Section 4 of the Bill deals with the situation where the Minister of Public 
Works expropriates property on behalf of juristic persons who need the 
property to fulfil a public purpose. A similar provision is also contained 
in section 3 of the current Expropriation Act, but is expanded in the Bill to 
provide for situations where the juristic person is unable to implement or 
realise the public purpose. Effectively, section 4 of the Bill would enable an 
owner whose property was expropriated by the Minister of Public Works on 
behalf of a juristic person to be able to take re-transfer of his property, but 
only in very limited circumstances.
Section 4(1) of the Bill states that the Minister of Public Works may 
expropriate property on behalf of a juristic person if the juristic person 
requires the property for a public purpose or in the public interest; could not 
reach an agreement for sale of the property with the owner;18 would be able 
to give effect to the purpose for which the property is required; and accepts 
in writing the conditions imposed by the Minister.19 The conditions placed 
14 Van der Walt & Slade (2012) SALJ 219-235. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 
497, 499.
15 Van der Walt & Slade (2012) SALJ 235. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 499.
16 Expropriation Bill 2013 (draft) GN 234 in GG 36269 of 20-03-2013 (“the Expropriation Bill”) (released 
for public comment 15-03-2013).
17 Explanatory memorandum on the Expropriation Bill.
18 This effectively means that expropriation of the property would not be possible if a less drastic means 
(such as concluding a contract of sale for the property or purchasing alternative property on the open 
market) would have been sufficient to realise the purpose for which expropriation is sought. On the less 
invasive means argument, see BV Slade “The Less Invasive Means Argument in Expropriation Law” 
(2013) TSAR 199-216.
19 Unlike s 3 of the Expropriation Act, “juristic person” is not given further content in s 4 of the Bill. In s 3 of 
the Expropriation Act a juristic person includes, amongst others, universities and technikons. However, a 
broader definition of a juristic person is included in s 1 of the Bill to include “a juristic person established 
in terms of law and who accounts for the management of its finances in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999 or the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003”.
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on the juristic persons in terms of section 4(3) of the Bill are to be welcomed, 
although the proper application of the conditions is not entirely clear.
Section 4(3)(a) of the Bill states that “the juristic person must give effect to 
the purpose for which the property was expropriated within the time frame 
determined by the Minister”.20 It can be assumed that the time frame given 
by the Minister would depend on the purpose for which the property was 
expropriated and would therefore depend on the specific circumstances 
of each expropriation.21 The juristic person is further compelled to use the 
property only for the purpose for which it was expropriated.22 It has been 
argued that in terms of the constitutional requirements for a valid expropriation, 
expropriated property may only ever be used for the purpose for which it was 
expropriated.23 Nevertheless, the confirmation of this position in the Bill in 
this, however limited, regard should be welcomed.
The Bill also implicitly recognises that circumstances may change to 
such an extent that the initial purpose becomes unrealisable. As a result, the 
Bill requires that written permission must be obtained from the Minister if 
the property is to be used for a different purpose, but on condition that the 
changed purpose must also be a public purpose or in the public interest.24 This 
condition raises several issues. The Bill as it stands creates the impression that 
the Minister decides whether or not the new purpose is a valid public purpose 
or in the public interest. If the Minister decides whether or not the changed 
purpose is also a valid public purpose or in the public interest, what is the 
chance that the new purpose would be tested by a court or that the Minister’s 
decision to approve the change would be reviewed in terms of administrative 
law?25 It is doubtful that the juristic person would make a claim based on the 
fact that the new purpose is not a valid public purpose or in the public interest, 
since from the structure of the section it seems as if the juristic person has to 
approach the Minister to have the purpose changed in the first place.26 The 
previous owner would probably not be interested in approaching a court to 
either test the new purpose against the constitutional requirements or review 
the Minister’s decision to change the purpose. Firstly, the Harvey decision 
stands in the way of such a claim and secondly, the Bill does not address the 
Harvey issue, but only allows for repurchase of the property by the previous 
owner in very limited circumstances as is indicated below.
Section 4(3)(c) states that the juristic person must transfer ownership to the 
state if it (the juristic person) fails to implement the purpose within the time 
20 S 4(3)(a) of the Bill.
21 However, see the argument below in part 3 concerning a general time frame for completion of the public 
purpose set by legislation.
22 S 4(3)(b) of the Bill.
23 Van der Walt & Slade (2012) SALJ 235; Du Plessis (2011) TSAR 590-592.
24 S 4(3)(b) of the Bill. The Bill does not explicitly state whether the Minister must set a time frame for 
realisation of the public purpose when a change in purpose has been approved. However, it can be 
assumed that when the Minister approves in writing a change in purpose he will also determine the time 
frame within which the changed purpose must be realised as indicated in s 4(3)(a) of the Bill.
25 Van der Walt & Slade (2012) SALJ 234 point out that the courts should be in a position to test the new 
purpose against the constitutional requirements to ensure that the expropriation remains valid.
26 However, the juristic person will probably approach a court to review the Minister’s decision if the 
Minister denies the change in purpose as requested by the juristic person.
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frame determined by the Minister or if the juristic person continues to use 
the property – contrary to the Minister’s written instruction – for a purpose 
“other than for which the property is expropriated” or for the changed purpose 
as agreed to with the Minister in terms of section 4(3)(b). In this regard the 
state, and not the previous owner, would be able to take re-transfer of the 
expropriated property under these specific circumstances. The Bill also gives 
the national government, and not the previous owner, the right of first refusal 
if the juristic person decides to alienate the property.27
When the purpose could not be realised within the allotted time frame 
and the state has acquired ownership of the expropriated property in terms of 
section 4(3)(c), it has 180 days to decide whether or not to retain the property.28 
If the Minister of Public Works decides to retain the property the Bill prescribes 
certain formalities that have to be complied with, such as compensating the 
juristic person for certain expenses.29 However, if the Minister decides not to 
retain the property and dispose of it the expropriated owner may, not must, be 
given the right of first refusal to purchase the property at the current market 
value.30
Therefore, it is only in this isolated instance where the previous owner 
may be given the right to purchase the expropriated property at the current 
market value when the purpose for the expropriation could not be realised. 
As a result, the former owner would only receive the option to repurchase his 
previously expropriated property if the property was expropriated on behalf 
of a juristic person and that juristic person could not realise the original public 
purpose or the changed purpose for which permission was received and the 
property was transferred to the state and the state then decides to dispose of 
the property. Only in these circumstances may the owner be given the right to 
repurchase the property at the current market value. This provision does not 
resolve the issue that was present in the Harvey decision. In that decision the 
property was not expropriated on behalf of a juristic person, but was acquired 
by the state for a specific public use. In other words, after expropriation took 
effect the property remained in “ownership” of the state, which means that 
section 4 of the Bill and the re-transfer of property upon non-realisation of the 
public purpose would not apply.
3  Addressing the Harvey issue in legislation
Since there is no legislation that can regulate the re-transfer of property upon 
the non-realisation of the public purpose apart from the isolated instance in 
the Expropriation Bill as explained above, certain recommendations are made 
here that should resolve the Harvey issue. Provision should be made in the Bill 
for mechanisms through which previous owners can reclaim their previously 
expropriated property in certain situations and to allow the courts to oversee 
this process if the need arises. The main objective of the amending provisions 
27 S 4(3)(e) of the Bill.
28 S 4(11).
29 S 4(12)(a).
30 S 4(12)(c).
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should be to indicate the nature of this right of re-transfer, the persons entitled 
to claim re-transfer, the time-frame within which the expropriated owner can 
reclaim the property upon non-implementation of the purpose, setting up a 
framework for calculating the amount that has to be repaid, as well as the 
circumstances under which the state would not be required to re-transfer the 
property to the previous owner.
In English law there are rules that regulate the position when compulsory 
acquired property becomes surplus, in other words when it is no longer needed 
for the purpose for which it was acquired. In terms of the Crichel Down Rules 
certain government departments are required to offer back compulsorily 
acquired property or property sold under the threat of compulsory acquisition 
to the former owners or their successors in title when the property is no longer 
needed for the purpose for which it was acquired.31 In terms of the Circular 
on Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules, the rules are non-
statutory and therefore, not compulsory.32 However, it is assumed that these 
rules should apply in a mandatory manner by certain departments.33 The 
general rule is located in paragraph 10 to the Circular:
“Where a department wishes to dispose of land to which the Rules apply, former owners will, as a 
general rule, be given a first opportunity to repurchase the land previously in their ownership provided 
that its character has not materially changed since acquisition.”34
Therefore, former owners or their successors in title are given a first 
opportunity to purchase the land when the purpose of acquisition ends.35 In 
terms of the Rules, the property is to be sold to the qualifying former owner at 
the current market value as established by a professionally qualified valuation 
officer.36 There are certain exceptions to this general rule that are discussed 
below.
However, since the Rules are non-statutory they frequently conflict with 
state departments’ own policies concerning the disposal of land. Therefore, 
“there is much misunderstanding leading to inconsistent and often 
31 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules Circular 
06/2004 (31 October 2004). See also V Moore “Compulsory Purchase in the United Kingdom” in GM 
Erasmus (ed) Compensation for Expropriation: A Comparative Study I (1990) 1 4-5; R Gibbard “The 
Crichel Down Rules: Conduct or Misconduct in the Disposal of Public Lands?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern 
Studies in Property Law II (2003) 329 329. It should be noted that the origin of the Rules is particular to 
the United Kingdom, but basically the origin of the rules came as a result of public outcry (together with 
allegations of corruption and maladministration) when a property owner’s request to re-purchase land 
that was compulsorily acquired for use during the Second World War was denied. For a more detailed 
account of the origin and development of the Crichel Down Rules, see Gibbard “The Crichel Down Rules” 
in Modern Studies in Property Law II 330; Department of Communities and Local Government The 
Operation of the Crichel Down Rules (2000) 3 1-3 5.
32 “This Part of the Memorandum sets out the revised non-statutory arrangements (‘Crichel Down Rules’)”; 
“So far as local authorities and statutory bodies in England are concerned, it is recommended that they 
follow the Rules”: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down 
Rules 109 paras 1, 4.
33 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules 109 paras 3, 4.
34 110 para 10.
35 See Gibbard “The Crichel Down Rules” in Modern Studies in Property Law II 334. A successor in title 
is a successor in terms of a will and “includes those who would have succeeded by means of a second or 
subsequent will or intestacy”: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel 
Down Rules 119 para 10.
36 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules 114 para 26.
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inappropriate application of the Rules”.37 In view of the uncertainties and 
difficulties that arise due to the non-statutory nature of the Crichel Down Rules 
it is not advisable to adopt that approach. Rather, provision for re-transfer of 
expropriated property upon non-realisation of the public purpose should place 
a statutory obligation on the expropriating authority to follow a particular 
process when the purpose for which the property was expropriated cannot be 
realised, ends, or if it is subsequently abandoned. This process should also be 
activated when the expropriated owner reclaims the property upon the non-
realisation or abandonment of the original purpose, or if the previous owner 
claims that the changed purpose is not a valid public purpose.
The issue of the lapse of time should be addressed clearly in the provisions 
that allow for the re-transfer of expropriated property upon non-realisation 
of the public purpose. The Expropriation Bill indicates that the Minister has 
to determine the time frame within which the juristic person must realise 
the purpose if the property was expropriated in terms of section 4 of the 
Bill. However, it is probably better that legislation should provide a general 
time frame for the realisation of the public purpose and allow the Minister to 
deviate from this time frame if a good reason exists. The general provision 
should state that if the purpose for which the property was expropriated had 
not been realised within a certain period, for instance three years, the state 
should file a new purpose. Notice of the new purpose could be served on 
the previous owner or be advertised in the Government Gazette and/or local 
newspapers. If a new purpose is not filed, the previous owner should be able 
to claim a right of repossession of the property. There are examples in foreign 
law of how such a time frame could be construed. In French law an owner can 
reclaim the property if it has not been used for the public purpose for a period 
of five years.38 In Dutch law, an owner can reclaim the property after three 
years have lapsed and it has not been used for the intended purpose.39 The 
time frame is something that has to be decided by the legislator, but it should 
be a relatively short period (three to five years) rather than a longer period, 
since the whole purpose of expropriation is to expropriate property that is 
required, many times on an urgent basis, for the realisation of a particular 
public purpose.
If the purpose for which the property was expropriated is abandoned or 
completed after the three year time period, the question as to what the state 
can do with the property arises. As a general rule, the expropriated property 
should always be used for a public purpose. Therefore, upon completion or 
abandonment of the public purpose, the state should be forced to follow a 
specific process. If the state department that initially needed the property for 
the fulfilment of a public purpose can use it for a different public purpose the 
state can retain possession of the property, since it would still be justified in 
doing so.40 In that regard the state should file the new purpose, for instance 
37 Gibbard “The Crichel Down Rules” in Modern Studies in Property Law II 351.
38 Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 93.
39 Art 61 of the Onteigeningswet of 1851. See also Sonnekus & Pleysier (2011) TSAR 619.
40 In this regard the Expropriation Bill acknowledges that the original public purpose may be substituted 
with a different public purpose. See s 4(3)(b).
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by advertising it in the Government Gazette. If the previous owner contests 
the change of purpose, the courts should be able to decide whether the new 
purpose is a valid public purpose.
If the original state department cannot use the property for a different 
public purpose but it can be used for a valid public purpose by a different 
state department, the previous owner’s right to reclaim the property should 
generally be excluded, provided that the proposed use by the different 
state department is also advertised in the Government Gazette.41 However, 
if the previous owner argues that the purpose for which the different state 
department will use the property is not a valid public purpose, he should be 
able to approach a court to determine whether the property is still to be used 
for a valid public purpose. If the state department that initially required the 
property for a public purpose or a different state department cannot use the 
property for a different public purpose or if the court determines that the new 
purpose is not a valid public purpose, the previous owner should be given 
the first opportunity to purchase the land in order to take repossession of the 
property. The offer to repurchase should be made within a specific time period 
(for instance a year) after the state or a court has concluded that the property 
cannot be used for a different public purpose.
Therefore, when a new public purpose or public interest cannot be 
established and the state wants to dispose of the land, the legislation should 
force the expropriating authority to first offer the property to the previous 
owner or his successors in title.42 In that sense, the price that has to be repaid 
should either be the current market value of the property, as is the case in 
terms of the United Kingdom’s Crichel Down Rules, or the compensation that 
was originally paid plus legal interest.43 The Expropriation Bill, if passed into 
law, would require the previous owner to pay the “prevailing market value” if 
she exercised her right of first refusal in terms of the isolated circumstances 
discussed above.44 Given the argument below concerning the re-transfer 
41 The Crichel Down Rules provide that if the compulsorily acquired land is needed by a different state 
department, the current department is not required to offer the property to the previous owner when the 
purpose for which the property was acquired ceases: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory 
Purchase and the Crichel Down Rules 111 para 15 1. Furthermore, if the land is needed by a local 
authority or body with compulsory purchase power the current state department is not required to offer 
the property to the previous owner but on condition that the said body had the necessary authority at the 
time of acquisition to acquire the land: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase and 
the Crichel Down Rules 111 para 15 2.
42 In this regard the Bill recognises the owner’s right of first refusal when the state wants to dispose of the 
property in the circumstances described above at part 2.
43 In the Philippine decision of Ouano v Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport Authority v Inocian GR No 168770; GR No 168812, 9 February 2011 the applicants 
reclaimed their previously expropriated property when the purpose of the expropriation could not be 
realised. The court held that the state no longer acquired unrestricted ownership of expropriated property. 
The transfer of property to the state as a result of expropriation is always conditional on it being used for 
the public purpose for which it was expropriated. Therefore, the applicants were successful in reclaiming 
the property and they had to repay the compensation initially received plus legal interest. (Although the 
right to reclaim expropriated property upon non-realisation of the public purpose developed in Philippine 
law on the basis of the assurances that were routinely given to expropriated owners in expropriation 
procedures, the decision shows that property should as a general rule only be used for the purpose for 
which it was expropriated). For a discussion of this decision see Van der Walt & Slade (2012) SALJ 
231-233.
44 S 4(12)(c) of the Bill.
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of property that has materially changed since expropriation, the preference 
towards market value is probably the correct one.
In terms of the Crichel Down Rules, the state is under no obligation to 
offer the property to the previous owner upon the abandonment of the public 
purpose when the property has been changed materially, for instance through 
development.45 The Rules state that property is deemed to have materially 
changed when buildings have been erected on land that was vacant when it 
was expropriated. Therefore, in the event that the state expropriates a vacant 
piece of land to build a hospital and in fact does so, but later the hospital falls 
into disuse because of a lack of funds, the state is under no obligation to offer 
the property to the previous owner.
However, it is arguable that the state could in that instance still offer the 
property to the previous owner, or his successors in title. If the price that 
has to be paid is market value, the owner will not be unduly favoured since 
he would have to pay for any improvements that might have been made to 
the property. There might be other instances where the state may be exempt 
from selling previously expropriated property, even to the previous owner. 
One example might include a nuclear electricity plant that was erected on 
expropriated land that fell into disuse. There may be a strong case not to sell 
the property since it may contain hazardous waste. If the property has been 
developed for or is usable for land reform purposes, the expropriating authority 
may also be exempt from offering the property to the previous owner, since 
the expropriation of property for land reform purposes is in the public interest.
The law as it stands states that the state is only allowed to use expropriated 
property for a public purpose.46 What should happen when the state no 
longer has a need for the property and the previous owner rejects the offer to 
re-purchase the land? It is arguable that in this case, and in only this case, the 
state is able to deal with the property as if it held it in private ownership. In 
this instance, the public purpose probably has played its part and has rendered 
enough protection to the expropriated owner. It has ensured that the original 
expropriation was for a public purpose and it has given the expropriated owner 
the opportunity to reclaim the property when the property could no longer be 
used for a valid public purpose. In that regard the state can freely dispose of 
the property in any manner it deems fit.
Detailed legislation is required to resolve the issue that arose in the Harvey 
decision. The main objective of the amending provisions should be to indicate 
the nature of this right of re-transfer; the persons entitled to claim re-transfer; 
the time-frame within which the expropriated owner can reclaim the property 
upon the non-implementation of the purpose; calculation of the amount that 
45 This includes instances where buildings have been erected on previously bare land or where additions 
to existing buildings were made that altered the character of the land. Temporary buildings will not 
necessarily constitute a material change and in evaluating whether development had materially changed 
the land, the relevant state department should consider the cost of restoring the land to its original state. 
In the event that a portion of the land had been materially changed, the portion that was not materially 
changed can be offered to the previous owner: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Compulsory Purchase 
and the Crichel Down Rules 110 paras 10-11.
46 See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 499; Du Plessis (2011) TSAR 590-592.
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has to be paid for re-transfer; as well as the circumstances under which the 
state would not be required to re-transfer the property to the previous owner. In 
that regard the state would be prevented from changing the purpose for which 
expropriated property is used at its own discretion. It would also prevent the 
state from using a valid public purpose as a smokescreen to use the property 
for a different purpose after the property has been expropriated.
SUMMARY
In Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) (“Harvey”) the High Court had to decide 
whether it was competent to order the re-transfer of expropriated property to the previous owner when 
the purpose for which the property was expropriated could not be realised. The court refused to order 
the re-transfer of the property due to the absence of legislation that authorises the Court to re-transfer 
expropriated property upon the non-realisation of the purpose of the expropriation. In March 2013, 
a draft Expropriation Bill was released for public comment. This note shows that the Expropriation 
Bill, if passed into law, does not address the issue that was present in Harvey, but only allows for the 
re-transfer of previously expropriated property in very limited circumstances.
Since the Expropriation Bill does not effectively address the issue that was present in Harvey, 
recommendations are made that should resolve the issue that was present in that decision. The main 
objective of the amending provisions should be to indicate the nature of the right of re-transfer, the 
persons entitled to claim re-transfer, the time-frame within which the expropriated owner can reclaim 
the property upon non-implementation of the purpose, setting up a framework for calculating the 
amount that has to be repaid, as well as the circumstances under which the state would not be required 
to re-transfer the property to the previous owner.
Including detailed legislation that effectively resolves the issue in Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality, 
the state would be prevented from changing the purpose for which expropriated property is used at its 
own discretion. It would also prevent the state from using a valid public purpose as a smokescreen to 
use the property for a different purpose after the property has been expropriated.
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